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COLLOQUIUM

Toward the anthropology of
white nationalist postracialism
Comments inspired by Hall, Goldstein, and
Ingram’s “The hands of Donald Trump”
Jeff Maskovsky, Queens College and the Graduate
Center, CUNY

This article explains Donald Trump’s brutal political effectiveness in terms of his white
nationalist appeal. It locates the intellectual, popular, and policy imperatives of Trumpism
in a new form of racial politics that I am calling white nationalist postracialism. This is
a paradoxical politics of twenty-first-century white racial resentment whose proponents
seek to do two contradictory things: to reclaim the nation for white Americans while also
denying an ideological investment in white supremacy. The article shows how Trump’s
excoriation of political correctness, his nostalgia for the post–WWII industrial economy,
his use of hand gestures, and his public speaking about race work together to telegraph
a white nationalist message to his followers without making them feel that he is, or they
are, racist. I end the article by explaining why I think that Donald Trump’s embrace of
many white nationalist ideological precepts—if not quite yet of white nationalism as a
fully realized political project—makes good political sense in the twenty-first-century
United States.
Keywords: race, racism, populism, whiteness, nationalism, politics, United States

Kira Hall, Donna Goldstein, and Matthew Ingram (2016) have written a brave
and insightful piece on Donald Trump’s politically unprecedented use of comedic
gestural enactments during the 2016 Republic primary season. Pundits have asserted repeatedly that no candidate showed more mastery of the art of the political put-down or exploited more effectively the public’s appetite for grotesquerie,
scandal, and politics-as-entertainment than did Donald Trump. Hall, Goldstein,
and Ingram give substance to this assertion with a detailed account of the ways that
 his work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Jeff Maskovsky.
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Trump used hand gestures to mock his political opponents, reinforce his outsider
political status, elevate himself, and thrill supporters. Their piece is a novel and
important contribution to the study of political communication in the media- and
entertainment-saturated twenty-first-century United States. The piece stands out
as an early effort to take Trump seriously. It helps to explain his brutal political effectiveness in a moment when much of the liberal intellectual establishment is still
wallowing in helpless apoplexy at Trump’s political rise.
An important part of Hall, Goldstein, and Ingram’s argument is its treatment of Trump’s presidential political campaign as a paradigmatic expression of
late-capitalist spectacle. I could not agree more with this analysis. The authors are
brilliant in tracing the unique and disturbing ways that Trump brings together entertainment, entrepreneurial triumphalism, and mockery of the political establishment to mask his own business class agenda and its implications for the production
and reproduction of class division and economic inequality. Yet racial politics are,
I think, just as important as are late-capitalist class politics to Trump’s populist appeal. In this commentary, I want to tease out the ways that the intellectual, popular,
and policy imperatives of Trumpism are rooted in a new form of racial politics
that I am calling white nationalist postracialism. This is a paradoxical politics of
twenty-first-century white racial resentment. Its proponents seek to do two contradictory things: to reclaim the nation for white Americans while also denying an
ideological investment in white supremacy. And they attempt to accomplish this
feat by a highly selective reading of post–Civil Rights era US history. There is, of
course, nothing new about white nationalism; the freighting of national identity
to white ethnic identity has a long inglorious history in the United States (Saxton
[1990] 2003). Further, white nationalist populisms frequently surface at times of
great economic inequality, though they are by no means the only kinds of populism
to emerge in these times (Kazin 2016). But the reappearance of white nationalism
in the post–Civil Rights era is new, if not wholly unprecedented, and in urgent need
of study. For this is an era during which the New Right (and some neoliberals) have
made a political art form of the selective appropriation of Civil Rights era political discourses about enfranchisement and equality to justify the rollback of Civil
Rights legislation and policies, dismantle the social democratic tradition, attack
Keynesian welfare statism, and advance color-blind policy and postracial ideology
(see Mullings 2005 for an extensive discussion of anthropological scholarship on
unmarked or postracial racism). The New Right’s attack on Affirmative Action is a
case in point. The New Right argument against efforts to create educational and job
opportunities for groups that have not been treated fairly in the past is not predicated on the idea that whites should receive preferential treatment because they
are biologically or culturally superior. Rather, the argument is based on the idea
that racial discrimination is no longer a factor that affects educational attainment
or hiring: people should be judged on the basis of “merit” alone, not race. According to this reasoning, Affirmative Action policies perpetuate racial inequalities by
offering “preferred treatment” to individuals who do not deserve it and thus block
talented individuals from attaining success. This case exemplifies the New Right’s
proclivity to use the themes and language of the civil rights movement to defeat its
goals (Ansell 1997). And this is the specific context in which today’s white nationalism is embedded.
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (1): 433–440
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Trump’s excoriation of political correctness is the centerpiece to his political
worldview and a cornerstone of his populist appeal. With it, he stokes white nationalist sentiments, mobilizing supporters to be outraged by PC-induced free speech
violations and in defense of white cultural worlds that, in this formulation, are
perceived to be under constant attack by liberal accusations of racial insensitivity.
Freighted to his anti-PC stance is a politics of nostalgia for a fictitious industrial
heyday when Americans were purportedly better off. Indeed, the solution for the
precarious status of many Americans today is, for Trump, a return not to the 1970s
and 80s, when white ethnicity was celebrated across the political spectrum, or to the
1990s, when the culture wars were at their peak, but to the mid-twentieth century,
and to the industrial economy and welfare statism of that era. And this is an explicit
desire to return to that era, as it actually existed, with its racist and sexist hierarchies
wholly intact. Although Trump is often viewed as ideologically inconsistent to the
point of incoherency, his call for a new “industrial revolution”—his denunciation of
free trade, his emphasis on Rust Belt manufacturing jobs, his grandstanding as the
savior of jobs at the Carrier’s Indianapolis factory—combines with his support for
current levels of Social Security and Medicare spending in his first proposed budget
(while slashing the rest of the federally funded safety net) to define white male workers as the virtuous majority whom Trump claims to represent. Accordingly, it is the
welfare statism part of Trumpism that so offends neoconservative intellectuals, who
are fully invested in its dismantling, while it is the racist and sexist parts of the equation that offend the liberal establishment, which was nonetheless unable to mount a
successful electoral political campaign to defeat him. This is, of course, a politics that
few nonwhite Americans can embrace and that offends many women. Indeed, it is a
nostalgia for a time of legal segregation that existed prior to the women’s movements
of the 1960s and 1970s. The immediate postwar period was also a time when whiteness and masculinity worked as unmarked categories of privilege, when the maintenance of the social order was presumed to be one in which white men had political
and economic power. And it is that era that Trump compares favorably to the present period of overt race talk, liberal multiculturalism, and liberal social policy.
Yet Trump is invested in a different kind of race talk. Take, for example, his talk
about Black America, which reflects a similar investment in white male resurrection. For black Americans, Trump expresses mostly pity for the harrowing, violent
conditions of life in the inner city. He blames Democrats for decades of policy
experimentation that locked black Americans in the inner city (again there is just
enough truth in this claim to make it grossly misleading). Trump’s prescription for
change, ironically (given his current hostility to Democrats) is to suggest that the
Bill Clinton–era welfare-to-work regime should be extended to all other safety net
programs, so black inner city residents will be forced to work, for instance, to get
food stamps or subsidized housing or government health insurance. Of course,
Trump’s description of the plight of inner city residents has very little to do with reality for most African Americans. Most African Americans are not poor, and they
do not live in the urban core. And by treating the black inner city as a metonym for
Black America, Trump alienated many African American voters. But this kind of
race talk signals something else entirely to his white middle class supporters, who
see black Americans both as government dependents for whom they hold disdain,
and as preferred recipients of government largesse.
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My observations of Trump’s public speaking suggest that Trump chose race
as a topic about which he would get serious, to demonstrate his presidential bona
fides, and further that his spectacular performances and dramatic hand gestures
are not limited exclusively to contexts that are just mocking. For example, in his
October 19th presidential debate with Hillary Clinton, Trump uses hand gestures
like those described by Hall, Goldstein, and Ingram—even if slightly less flamboyantly—to reinforce his point about the plight of the black and Latinx inner city, including hand waving, the pistol hand gesture, and a bull’s-eye gesture (not discussed
in “The Hands of Donald Trump”), which looks like the hand sign for “OK.” Often
discussed in scholarship on political style as the “precision-grip gesture” (Lempert
2011), Trump’s gesture helps here to emphasize the word shot: “Our inner cities are
a disaster. You get shot walking to the store. They have no education, they have no
jobs” (see Figure 1). Trump makes this statement emphatically but somberly, with no
hint of irony or mockery. And even if the words he says may insult African Americans and Latinxs by misrepresenting their communities, they allow white viewers to
read him as caring deeply about people of color and therefore as not racist.

Figure 1: Trump’s bull’s-eye gesture emphasizing the word “shot”
Third Presidential Debate, October 19, 2016; Politico.

Trump’s mocking tone and accompanying hand gestures return in his next statement when he criticizes Hillary Clinton: “I will do more for African Americans
and Latinos than she can ever do in ten lifetimes. All she’s done is talk to the
African Americans and to the Latinos, but they get the vote, and then they come
back—they say ‘we’ll see you in four years’” (Strauss 2016). Much has been made
of Trump’s racist use of the definite article the in statements such as these (Murphy
2016; Strauss 2016). But the full statement is also a brilliant display of white nationalist political performance. It reinforces the trope of the depraved racialized
inner city resident, the effaced status of whom economically insecure and downwardly mobile white middle class men and women are scrambling to avoid for
themselves. And it further signals precisely what many white Americans want to
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (1): 433–440
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hear about race: that Trump is not a racist, he cares for people of color, but he is
not going to abide by PC rules when he talks about race. Further, in this statement
he blames Democrats—not white privilege or institutional racism—for the plight
of immigrants and people of color, making it possible for white viewers to embrace
his white nationalist position without seeing it as one rooted overtly in white supremacy. Statements such as these helped to provide gravitas to Trump’s debate
performance at a crucial moment in his presidential campaign. With respect to his
hand gestures, I noticed in the video clip of his performance that they were remarkably similar as he moved from mockery to seriousness and back to mockery again.
This contiguous use of hand gestures in the context of a presidential debate helped
to telegraph to the audience that jesting and somber statements alike are both part
of the Trump political brand.
Why were performances like these effective? Much new research needs to be
done to understand not just what he says or does and how it might be appealing
to different political constituencies; we also need to understand better why Donald
Trump’s embrace of many white nationalist ideological precepts—if not quite yet of
white nationalism as a fully realized political project—makes good political sense
in the twenty-first-century United States. To a certain extent, white nationalism
in the United States is the deviant spawn of liberal forms of white ethnic identity
politics that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, in the aftermath of the Black power
and other protest movement of the 1960s and 1970s (di Leonardo 1998; Steinberg
1981). It has festered on the fringe of the Republican Party since the 1970s, encouraged (and frustrated) by the kind of cynical crypto race-baiting that has been a
hallmark of Republican politics since the 1960s, when, in the context of the Civil
Rights movement, Republicans put concerted effort into appealing to white Southerners’ racial resentments to gain their support. Its ideological precepts were honed
in the 1980s and 1990s during the culture wars, as part of the New Right condemnation of “illiberal” causes such as affirmative action, multiculturalism, political
correctness, and liberal immigration policy. And it gained traction in the context
of the austerity politics that the populist (not neoconservative) right asserted as a
counterweight to the Obama administration’s attempts at economic stimulus in the
aftermath of the global economic collapse of 2008.
The rise of the antitax, antigovernment Tea Party played a crucial role in this
ascendance. Funded into existence by the oil industry tycoons, the Koch brothers,
and by other libertarian and conservative donors, it was extremely effective in naming and then popularizing opposition to debt-driven government spending. Yet the
Tea Party turned out to be an unwieldy and unpredictable political formation. If
it started out as a movement of libertarian, antitax, deficit scolds, its rank and file
turned out to be more concerned about race and immigration than it was about
debt and fiscal constraint (Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011). Eventually,
much of the Tea Party became Trump’s political base. Controversial figures such as
Steve Bannon and his allies on the alt-right also helped to popularize the politics
of white racial resentment, as did Fox News. But I think that white nationalism is
a more broadly held worldview, crisscrossing Red State / Blue State divisions, and
class and gender differences among whites.
In this context, Trump was certainly not the only political figure to attempt to
craft a populist political message in the 2016 Republican primary race. Rand Paul
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tried as a Libertarian and Ted Cruz tried as a religious Conservative. They both
challenged the neoconservatism of the Republican establishment—but not with
respect to racial politics. Indeed, their records suggest strong adherence to New
Right postracial orthodoxy, though Paul did support some criminal justice reforms
that were ideologically heterodox. But Trump garnered more support from disgruntled Republican voters precisely because he was the most brazen in elaborating an antiglobalist, anti-immigrant, white nationalist–friendly stance. His politics
are thus noteworthy for their overt articulation of white racial resentments that
have long been exploited, sub rosa, by the Republican Party but that Trump has,
for his convenience, made explicit. Further, Trump had an oftentimes-overlooked
advantage over the other candidates. His foray into birtherism against President
Obama, which at the time was considered a fringe position, gave him early credibility in some white Republican quarters and firmly freighted his subsequent antiimmigrant, anti-Muslim positions to antiblack politics. This, alas, turned out to be
a very compelling articulation.
Across the last thirty years, we have seen the gradual fraying of longstanding
political arrangements that freight rights and recognition with access to public
resources, accompanied by a mad-dash scramble to formulate workable political
programs in defense of an ever-ambiguous category of “the middle class.” Trumpism is one such attempt that articulates that middle class in largely racial—and
racist—terms. The job of antiracist and left intellectuals in the Trump era is to raise
alarms about the threat to democracy that Trump poses, to document and publicize the consequences of his policies for the populations he targets as disposable
or politically threatening, and to align ourselves with, and participate in, political
groups that oppose him. But we must also do the hard work of trying to understand
his populist appeal, and to use what we learn to help to reimagine politics in ways
that unsettle political formations such as white nationalist postracialism. We must
also sustain the constructive critique of centrist Democratic Party neoliberalism
and Republican neoconservatism, whose respective failures contributed to the rise
of Trumpism in the first place, and to the authoritarian turn more generally in US
politics.
Building on the piece by Hall, Goldstein, and Ingram, we can see not just how
reactionary populist forces may benefit politically from using grotesque mockery
and critical gestures. These strategies and tactics may, as the authors tell us, help
also to animate opposition to Trump, building on the spectacular protest strategies
of groups such as the Black Panthers and ACT UP. Indeed, the mobilizations that
have already occurred since Trump’s inauguration have been boosted by spectacularly mocking protest signs and slogans like “We Shall Overcomb,” “Tweet Women
With Respect,” and “Without Immigrants, Trump Would Have No Wives.” Let us
hope that the new politics that repudiates Trump takes race and racism seriously.
As Trump’s ascendency demonstrates, the right has already mastered that trick.
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Vers une anthropologie du post-racialisme blanc nationaliste:
commentaires inspirés de l’article de Hall, Goldstein et Ingram
“The Hands of Donald Trump”
Résumé : Cet article explique l’efficacité politique redoutable de Donald Trump par
l’attrait du nationalisme blanc. Il situe les objectifs politiques et les enjeux intellectuels du Trumpisme dans une nouvelle forme de politique raciale que j’appelle le
post-racialisme blanc nationaliste. Il consiste en une politique paradoxale, propre
au 21e siècle, de ressentiment racial blanc dont les partisans cherchent à accomplir deux buts contradictoires: revendiquer la nation pour les Américains blancs
tout en niant les enjeux idéologique de la suprématie blanche. L’article montre que
la critique du politiquement correct de Donald Trump, sa nostalgie pour l’économie industrielle d’après-guerre, sa gestuelle, et ses discours sur le problème racial
agissent ensemble pour suggérer à ses soutiens un message nationaliste blanc, tout
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en les laissant penser que ni Trump ni eux ne sont racistes. Je termine cet article en
expliquant pourquoi je pense que l’adhésion de Trump aux préceptes idéologiques
du nationalisme blanc - sinon à un projet politique entièrement réalisé de nationalisme blanc - fait sens politiquement dans l’Amérique du 21e siècle.
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